Retracing the Right to Free Movement: Mapping a Path Forward by Myslinska, Dagmar R
Myslinska, Dagmar R. 2019. Retracing the Right to Free Movement: Mapping a Path Forward.
Michigan State International Law Review, 27(3), pp. 383-439. ISSN 2328-3068 [Article] (In Press)
http://research.gold.ac.uk/26563/
The version presented here may differ from the published, performed or presented work. Please
go to the persistent GRO record above for more information.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact
the Repository Team at Goldsmiths, University of London via the following email address:
gro@gold.ac.uk.
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated. For
more information, please contact the GRO team: gro@gold.ac.uk
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3228025 
 
 
*** DRAFT – DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION *** 
 
RETRACING THE RIGHT TO FREE MOVEMENT:  
MAPPING A PATH FORWARD? 
 
Dagmar Rita Myslinska* 
 
As a founding principle of the EU, a prerequisite for the exercise of 
most other EU rights, and a key component of EU integration, the freedom 
of movement right has carried great political and practical importance. It 
has also been one of the most contested, politically abused, and poorly 
understood of EU rights, particularly in the context of mobility of nationals 
from Central and Eastern Europe (“CEE”). Notably, misinformation 
regarding the free movement right that was spread by the media, 
politicians, and the public helped to propel both the UK’s renegotiation of 
its EU membership and, ultimately, its exit from the Union. Other EU-15 
State politicians have also been perpetuating myths about freedom of 
movement and immigration. Scholars addressing free movement, even in the 
context of Brexit, have devoted little attention to this right’s 
conceptualization as it has evolved over time, to how EU branches other 
than the European Court of Justice have approached it, or to how CEE 
nationals have been positioned and impacted by mobility’s legal 
framework. Although some critical scholars have critiqued derogations 
from the free movement right imposed on CEE nationals in the aftermath of 
their States’ accession to the EU, they have also failed to situate their 
analysis within a broader look at the creation and application of the legal 
framework behind mobility.  CEE movers in the UK and other EU-15 States 
have tended to be racialized by the media, politicians, and the public – that 
is, described and approached by individuals and institutions in ways which 
denigrate or assume their inferiority. Hence, several tenets of critical race 
theory (“CRT”) and critical whiteness studies (“CWS”) that expound the 
relationship between race, power, society, and law are helpful to the 
analysis of their mobility.  
This Article argues that the freedom of movement right has always been 
limited, and that CEE nationals’ mobility rights have been especially 
restricted by both EU statutes and case law – and further impeded by 
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restrictive Member State policies. Ultimately, the right of free movement 
has been created and consistently applied in a way as to benefit EU-15 
States’ economies, while approaching CEE movers as mere units of 
production. This broader understanding of this right is necessary to make 
Brexit negotiations more meaningful, and debates about intra-EU movers in 
other EU-15 States more responsible. Moreover, the discussion here also 
critiques CRT and CWS for overlooking the significance of immigrant 
background and of white minority ethnicities in the conceptualization and 
experience of equality. I suggest that both theoretical frameworks need to 
not only look beyond the black-white binary, but also consider 
contemporary transnational power dynamics to arrive at a more flexible 
and nuanced picture of micro-level racial and ethnic power relations in 
today’s globalized world. 
 
I.     INTRODUCTION  
 
Soon after its inclusion in Spaak’s 1956 blueprint for the establishment 
of the European common market1, freedom of movement of persons became 
widely regarded as a central aspect of the European integration project2. As 
a prerequisite for the exercise of most other EU rights3 (including the right 
to equality) and a tangible symbol of EU integration, the right carries great 
social, economic, and political importance4. Mobility has been proclaimed 
to be a fundamental right, a founding principle, and a core right of EU 
citizenship by the European Commission (the “Commission”)5, the 
European Parliament6, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the 
“ECJ”)7, and key EU representatives8. As revealed through Eurobarometer 
                                                 
1 Paul-Henri Spaak, The Brussels Report on the General Common Market 
(Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration 1956). 
2 Michael Johns, Post-Accession Polish Migrants in Britain and Ireland: Challenges 
and Obstacles to Integration in the European Union, 15 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 29-45 
(2013). 
3 Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Uecker, and 
Jacquet v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, ECLI:EU:C:1997:285. 
4 CAMINO MORTERA-MARTINEZ & CHRISTIAN ODENDAHL, WHAT FREE MOVEMENT 
MEANS TO EUROPE AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR BRITAIN (Centre for European Reform, 
2017). 
5 See, e.g., European Commission, Communication from the Commission: on guidance 
for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of 
the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, COM(2009) 313 final. 
6 See, e.g., European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 15 December 
2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the European Union (2013/C 168 E/12), 
OJEU C 168 E/88. 
7 See, e.g., Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for the Home 
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surveys, the public also considers it to be one of the most prized EU 
achievements. Western Member State (“EU-15”9) nationals have strongly 
supported unrestricted mobility among EU-15 States. For example, in 1986, 
74% supported an unlimited right to reside in all other EU-15 States.10 After 
the 2004 accession of A-8 States11 and the 2007 accession of A-2 States12 
(collectively, the “Eastern Enlargement”13) of ten Central and East 
European (“CEE”) countries, almost 90% of EU citizens polled considered 
mobility to be a fundamental right of their EU citizenship14. Majority of 
those polled in 2013 described it as the core EU right15, and the most 
positive achievement of the EU16.  
In 2014, 15 million EU nationals (approximately 3% of the EU’s 
population) were relying on their right to reside in other Member States17. 
Driven by employment opportunities and large gaps in earnings18, post-
2004 mobility has been predominantly from CEE to EU-15 States, with 
approximately 1.6 million CEE nationals taking up residence in EU-15 
states by 201019.  
Despite—or due to—its conceptual and practical significance, mobility 
has been a controversial concept at times. It was one of the most contested 
                                                                                                                            
Department, ECLI:EU:C:2002:493. 
8 See, e.g., Viviane Reding, European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights 
and Citizenship, Speech at the Conference for Mayors on EU Mobility at Local Level: Free 
Movement of EU citizens - turning challenges into opportunities at local level, 
SPEECH/14/123 (February 11, 2014). 
9 The fifteen Member States before 2004: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
10 See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb26/eb26_en.pdf. 
11 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. (Malta and Cyprus were also included in the 2004 enlargement.) 
12 Of Bulgaria and Romania. 
13 Both the European Council and the Commission consider the 2007 enlargement to 
have constituted the second wave of the 2004 enlargement. See Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Enlargement Strategy and Main 
Challenges 2006–2007, COM(2006)649. 
14 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer: Internal market: Awareness, 
perceptions, and impacts (2011), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ archives/ebs /ebs_363 
_en.pdf. 
15 European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 365 (February 2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_365_en.pdf. 
16 European Commission, Eurobarometer 79 (May 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
public_opinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79_en.pdf. 
17 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-9_en.htm.  
18 Mikkel Barslund & Matthias Busse, Labour Mobility in the EU: Dynamics, Patterns 
and Policies, 3 INTERECONOMICS 116-158 (2014). 
19 DER FINANZ EXPERTE, MOBILITY IN EUROPE REPORT (2011), available at 
http://www.mobilitypartnership.eu/WebApp/Reports.aspx. 
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topics during the Eastern Enlargement process, unpopular among EU-15 
citizenry and officials20. As far back as 1991, 63% of EU-15 citizens polled 
had wished to restrict potential future CEE migration, and 20% desired to 
ban it altogether21. Gearing up toward the Enlargement, in a poll taken in 
2002, 76% of EU-15 nationals who expected a “considerable” influx of 
post-accession CEE nationals regarded their mobility as a “negative” 
development22. Allegedly fearing welfare tourism—although studies 
indicated that such concerns were not warranted23—EU-15 States 
adamantly opposed an immediate post-accession access to free movement 
and to social benefits by CEE nationals24. Despite CEE politicians’ 
objections, temporary restrictions on CEE workers’ free movement were 
included in all accession treaties – imposed on CEE states acceding in 2004 
until April 2011, and on those acceding in 2007 until December 201325.  
When transitional limitations were coming to an end, renewed popular 
and political debates about benefit tourism and “poverty immigration” 
spread across EU-15 States26. In a 2011 Eurobarometer survey, the majority 
of nationals in every EU-15 State other than Sweden and Luxembourg 
agreed with the statement that the internal market had “flooded” their 
country with “cheap labour”27. Moreover, the 2008 economic crisis fueled 
Eurosceptic populist discourse condemning the freedom of movement right, 
and increasingly incorrectly labelling intra-EU movers (especially from 
CEE states) as “migrants” (synonymous with American “immigrants”) and 
“foreigners”28. Poles, Bulgarians, and Romanians have been especially 
                                                 
20 SAMANTHA CURRIE, MIGRATION, WORK AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE ENLARGED 
EUROPEAN UNION (2008); Michael Haynes, European Union and Its Periphery: Inclusion 
and Exclusion, 33(35) ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY 87-97 (1998). 
21 Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer 35: Public Opinion in 
the EC (June 1991), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb35/eb35_en.pdf. 
22 European Commission, Eurobarometer 57: EU15 Report (2002). 
23 Jon Kvist, Does EU Enlargement Start a Race to the Bottom? Strategic Interaction 
Among EU Member States in Social Policy, 14(3) JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY 
301-318 (2004); Michael Dougan, A Spectre is Haunting Europe… Freedom of Movement 
of Persons and the Eastern Enlargement, in EU ENLARGEMENT: A LEGAL APPROACH 111-
141 (Chrisophe Hillion ed., 2004). 
24 AGNIESZKA KUBAL, SOCIO-LEGAL INTEGRATION: POLISH POST-2004 EU 
ENLARGEMENT MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (2012). 
25 Restrictions on the mobility of nationals from Cyprus and Malta (which had 
replaced Bulgaria and Romania in the accession negotiation process) were never even 
considered – likely due to their small populations. 
26 Béla Galgóczi et al., Intra-EU labour migration: flows, effects and policy responses, 
Working Paper 2009.03 (European Trade Union Institute 2011); EVA-MARIA POPTCHEVA, 
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND RESIDENCE OF EU CITIZENS: ACCESS TO SOCIAL BENEFITS 
(European Parliamentary Research Service 2014). 
27 European Commission, supra note 14. 
28 Theodora Kostakopoulou, Mobility, Citizenship and Migration in a Post-Crisis 
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targeted29. In a 2013 letter to the President of the European Council for 
Justice and Home Affairs, Ministers representing Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom30 called for limitations on mobility of 
“immigrants” from other EU States due to CEE movers’ alleged abuse and 
strain on the social systems of “benefit magnet” Member States.  
From early 2000s, UK debates about its EU membership became 
conflated with mobility and immigration issues31. As part of the UK’s 
membership renegotiation, Prime Minister David Cameron sought to 
decrease mobility into the UK, or at least EU citizens’ welfare access - even 
by economically active movers. The British public’s support for the UK’s 
“New Settlement” with the EU focused on restricting EU movers’ access to 
benefits32. Concerns regarding free movement, and especially CEE 
workers’ mobility and their access to benefits, ultimately played a key part 
during the Brexit campaign and its outcome33.  
The conflation of EU membership, free movement right, and 
immigration by the media, politicians, and the public—during both the 
renegotiation process and the Brexit campaign—has been based on several 
inaccuracies. Central among them were the misconceptions that the ECJ had 
been overstretching Treaty34 provisions and secondary laws on free 
movement rights35, that Member States have little discretion to affect 
movers’ access to welfare benefits36, and that movers choose where to move 
                                                                                                                            
Europe, IMAGINING EUROPE Nr. 9, 5 (Instituto Affari Internazionali 2014). 
29 Iwona Sobis et al., Polish plumbers and Romanian strawberry pickers: how the 
populist framing of EU migration impacts national policies, 5(3) MIGRATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 431-454 (2016). 
30 See http://docs.dpaq.de/3604-130415_letter_to_presidency_final_1_2.pdf. 
31 James Dennison & Andrew Geddes, Brexit and the perils of ‘Europeanised’ 
migration, 25(8) JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 1137-1153 (2018). 
32 Catherine Barnard & Sarah Fraser Butlin, Free Movement vs. Fair Movement: Brexit 
and Managed Migration, 55 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 203-226 (2018); Eiko 
Thielemann & Daniel Schade, Buying into Myths: Free Movement of People and 
Immigration, 87(2) THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY 139-147 (2016). 
33 Mortera-Martinez and Odendahl, supra note 4. 
34 Unless otherwise indicated, “Treaty”, as used throughout this Article, refers to the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and, after 1993, to the Treaty on 
European Union, including their amendments. 
35 Cameron himself incorrectly noted in his letter to Donald Tusk, President of the 
European Council, that ECJ had widened the scope of free movement beyond its statutory 
limitations. See David Cameron’s letter to Donald Tusk (Nov. 10, 2015), available at 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/475679/Donald_Tusk_letter.pdf. 
36 Samantha Currie, Reflecting on Brexit: Migration Myths and What Comes Next for 
EU Migrants in the UK?, 38(3) JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW 337-342 
(2016); Charlotte O’Brien, Civis Capitalism Sum: Class as the New Guiding Principle of 
EU Free Movement Rights, 53 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 937-978 (2016). 
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based on the attractiveness of host States’ welfare benefits, adversely 
affecting host economies37. Such misinformation has not been confined to 
the UK. Other EU-15 State politicians have been perpetuating similar 
myths38.  
More generally, the freedom of movement right has been “legally over-
complicated, politically abused, …  [and] popularly misunderstood”39. As 
Barnard and Butlin note, there is a need for “a radical rethink of the free 
movement of persons provisions”40. It is crucial to better understand this 
right, especially in the context of CEE movers, to allow for more 
meaningful Brexit negotiations and their aftermath, as well as for a more 
responsible approach toward intra-EU immigrants in other EU-15 States - to 
which their mobility will continue after Brexit, and where anti-immigrant 
discourse and policies have been gathering strength. 
Since the Brexit referendum, scholars have devoted more attention to 
free movement law and debates, but only during the last two decades. For 
example, Currie41, Dougan42, and O’Brien43 have pointed out that, over the 
last decade, the ECJ has been decreasing movers’ entitlements and 
tolerating increasing Member State discretion in doing so as well (most 
notably, through the imposition of national right-to-reside rules, and more 
demanding tests for what constitutes “work”44 and what constitutes 
“jobseeker” status from which worker protections stem). Others have 
emphasized the importance of public opposition to free movement to the 
referendum outcome45. Barnard and Butlin46, and Doherty47 have noted that 
                                                 
37 Thielemann & Schade 2016, supra note 32. 
38 Id.; Poptcheva, supra note 26. 
39 Jo Shaw, Between Law and Political Truth? Member State Preferences, EU Free 
Movement Rules and National Immigration Law 3, Univ. of Edinburgh School of Law, 
Research Paper Series No. 2015/28 (2015). 
40 Barnard & Butlin, supra note 32. 
41 Currie, supra note 36. 
42 Michael Dougan, The Bubble that Burst: Exploring the Legitimacy of the Case Law 
on the Free Movement of Union Citizens, in JUDGING EUROPE’S JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY 
OF THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 127–154 (M. Adams et al. eds., 
2013). 
43 O’Brien, supra note 36. 
44 Both the 2015 FreSsco study and the ongoing EU Rights Project have documented 
that some Member States have increasingly been treating even movers who are not 
economically inactive as such, placing heavy burdens on workers to prove their entitlement 
to worker status, and designating work as “marginal and ancillary” (and thus not leading to 
worker status) simply due to being based on temporary contracts. See Charlotte O’Brien et 
al., The concept of worker under Article 45 TFEU and certain non-standard forms of 
employment, FreSsco Comparative Report (2015), available at www.ec.europa.eu/social/ 
BlobServlet?docId=15476&langId=en; The EU Rights Project, www.eurightsproject.co.uk. 
45 Dennison & Geddes, supra note 31; Thielemann & Schade, supra note 32. 
46 Barnard & Butlin, supra note 32. 
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historically, the right to free movement has always been limited via statutes 
and case law, but again, focused mostly on recent EU legal developments 
and did not consider how actual movers have been affected by them.  
Outside of the Brexit context, similarly little attention has been devoted 
to this right’s conceptualization as it has evolved over time, to how EU 
branches other than the ECJ have approached it, or to how CEE nationals 
have been positioned and impacted by it. Detailed academic analyses of the 
right to free movement have traditionally focused on black letter law, at 
specific moments in time48, and more recently, on the ECJ’s approach 
toward access to social benefits by mobile individuals49. Although some 
scholars have pointed out tensions between EU and Member State 
approaches toward free movement50, and internal tensions in the EU’s free 
movement law51, little academic attention has been paid to the evolution of 
such challenges over time, and to CEE movers’ position. The one notable 
textbook that traces the evolution of EU law over time devotes only a 
chapter to freedom of movement of persons, in which, again, the focus is 
recent ECJ case law52. Similarly, scholarship on CEE nationals’ mobility 
rights has tended to explain black letter law at the time of the 2004 and 
2007 enlargements53, and more recently, the effects of mobility on both 
sending and host States54 and on mobile CEE nationals themselves55.  
                                                                                                                            
47 Michael Doherty, Through the Looking Glass: Brexit, Free Movement and the 
Future, 27(3) KING'S LAW JOURNAL 375-386 (2016). 
48 See, e.g., CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR 
FREEDOMS (2013); DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND 
MATERIALS (2014); PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXTS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS (2015); F. ROSSI DAL POZZO, CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF 
MOVEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2013); PEDRO CARO DE SOUSA, THE EUROPEAN 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH (2015); NIGEL FOSTER, FOSTER ON 
EU LAW (2017); JOHN HANDOLL, FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN THE EU (1995); ERIKA 
SZYSZCZAK & ADAM CYGAN, UNDERSTANDING EU LAW (2008); LORNA WOODS ET AL., 
STEINER & WOODS EU LAW (2017). 
49 See, e.g., Rebecca Zahn, 'Common Sense' or a Threat to EU Integration? The Court, 
44(4) INDUSTRIAL LAW JOURNAL 573-586 (2015). 
50 See, e.g., ELISE MUIR, EU REGULATION OF ACCESS TO LABOUR MARKETS: A CASE 
STUDY OF EU CONSTRAINTS ON MEMBER STATE COMPETENCES (2012); CHRISTOFFER C. 
ERIKSEN, THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION, WELFARE STATES AND DEMOCRACY: THE FOUR 
FREEDOMS VS NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION (2012). 
51 See, e.g., PANOS KOUTRAKOS ET AL., EXCEPTIONS FROM EU FREE MOVEMENT LAW: 
DEROGATION, JUSTIFICATION AND PROPORTIONALITY (2016). 
52 Sofia O’Leary, Free Movement of Persons and Services, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU 
LAW 499-546 (Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca eds., 2011). 
53 See e.g., Peter van Elsuwege, The Treaty of Accession and Differentiation in the EU, 
72(64) JURISPRUDENCIJA 117–123 (2005). 
54 See, e.g., ETTORE RECCHI & ADRIAN FAVELL, PIONEERS OF EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION: CITIZENSHIP AND MOBILITY IN THE EU (2009). 
55 See, e.g., Zinovijus Ciupijus, Ethical Pitfalls of Temporary Labour Migration: A 
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Critical scholars have critiqued post-accession transitional mobility 
limitations for undermining the concepts of equality and EU citizenship, 
and for contradicting EU laws56. They have not situated their critique, 
however, in a broader analysis of the free movement right and its evolution. 
There is much space for a critical look at how CEE nationals have been 
situated in both the creation and application of the legal framework behind 
mobility, especially since they have been subjected to racialization, unlike 
western EU citizens. For example, EU institutions have portrayed them as 
fundamentally different than western Europeans, not part of European 
heritage, and not entitled to the same treatment as those from western 
Member States57. Moreover, the British media, politicians and the public 
have attacked CEE movers58, ultimately contributing to, at least in part, the 
outcome of the Brexit referendum.  
Several tenets that both critical race theory (“CRT”) and critical 
whiteness studies (“CWS”) expound lay the groundwork for my approach 
toward the intricate relationship between race, power, and law. Law, 
everyday discourse, economics, politics, and culture play a role in 
propagating white elites’ power and privilege - by ignoring, naturalizing, 
sanctioning, and at times inciting discrimination against other groups59. 
Those in positions of social power construct legal frameworks in ways that 
benefit them60. To unpack law’s role, I have been re-examining historical 
and legal records to focus on the underlying assumptions and interests that 
they serve. My analysis in this Article relies on an empirical qualitative 
study, based on systematic content analyses of relevant hard and soft laws, 
and legal discourse. I also draw on historical, economic, political, and other 
                                                                                                                            
Critical Review of Issues, 97 BUSINESS ETHICS 9-18 (2010); Katherine Botterill, Mobility 
and Immobility in the European Union: Experiences of Young Polish People Living in the 
UK, 1 STUDIA MIGRACYJNE - PRZEGLĄD POLONIJNY (POLONIA AND MIGRATION STUDIES) 
47-70 (2011). 
56 Sergio Carrera, What Does Free Movement Mean in Theory and Practice in an 
Enlarged EU?, 11(6) EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 699-721 (2005); Currie, supra note 20; 
Dimitri Kochenov, The European Citizenship Concept and Enlargement of the Union, 3(2) 
ROMANIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 71-97 (2003); WILLEM MAAS ED., 
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE (2013); Helen Stalford, 
Free Movement Post Accession – Transitional Arrangements in Poland and Bulgaria, 
Paper Presented at the Symposium on Science Policy: Mobility and Brain Drain in the EU 
and Candidate Countries (University of Leeds, July 2003). 
57 Dagmar Rita Myslinska, Peripheries of Equality and Belonging: Situating Brexit’s 
Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric within EU Narratives, __________ (forthcoming).  
58 Jon Fox et al., The Racialization of the New European Migration to the UK, 46(4) 
SOCIOLOGY 680-695 (2012). 
59 See generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC EDS., CRITICAL WHITE 
STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (1997). 
60 Id.  
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background data to bolster my claims, and to place my findings in their 
local context. Content analysis allows me to also consider texts’ latent 
characteristics, as well as any missing parts; and to make inferences from 
texts by relying on analytical constructs derived from my theoretical 
framework. As with all qualitative research, my purpose is not statistical 
generalization, but instead analytical generalization. That is, I seek to offer 
new insights based on theoretical and conceptual generalizations, and to 
help build better concepts and theories applicable to the world at large. 
Despite relying on some tenets of CRT and CWS, I find both theories 
too essentialist at their core - due to ignoring transnational and other non-
racial causes of inequalities61, and due to focusing on homogeneous races: 
privileged whites, and underprivileged others. In this Article, I critique CRT 
and CWS analytical approaches for overlooking the significance of 
immigrant background and of white minority ethnicities in the 
conceptualization and experience of equality, racism, and privilege. My 
“Crit-Crit” work also considers how the formal legal framework (in its 
creation, interpretation, and specific policy contexts) approaches 
immigrants, who do not easily fit the black-white paradigm. Taking into 
account contemporary transnational power dynamics, I aim to arrive at a 
more flexible and nuanced picture of micro-level racial and ethnic power 
relations62. This Article not only poses new questions, but also relies on 
new data as I read the free movement framework critically, from the point 
of view of contemporary CEE movers.  
Ironically, while today’s concepts of race and ethnicity have been 
largely the products of historical migrations and colonialism (as well as 
slavery), the continuing significance to that construction of contemporary 
movements of people has been overlooked by legal and race scholars, who 
tend to see their study groups through the black-white binary. Only by 
better understanding the ramifications of contemporary mobility on equality 
can we better respond to the cultural, economic, and political challenges 
posed by mobility and immigration in an increasingly globalizing world. 
More broadly, any inabilities of law to adequately respond to the 
experiences of immigrant groups might provide insights into its inability to 
regulate other groups that do not neatly fit into privileged/disadvantaged 
binaries. This will hopefully lead to redefining concepts such as race, 
                                                 
61 Although ClassCrits note the effects of lower socio-economic status on access to law 
and other power structures, and some critical scholars outside the United States have 
considered postcolonial effects on race construction, the role of globalization and 
contemporary immigrants in continuing to construct whiteness has been overlooked. 
LatCrit scholarship has opened up space for applying CRT to transnational power relations, 
but only between the global North and the global South. 
62 I am also aware of intersectionality issues—especially gender, and class—that affect 
the experience of equality by immigrants. 
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racism, discrimination, and equality so that they can better reflect 
multitudes of contemporary context-specific differences and power 
hierarchies. 
Below, I trace the free movement right from its initial conceptualization 
(in Part II.A.), through its temporary derogations in the aftermath of the 
Eastern Enlargement (in Part II. B.), to what it is today (in Part II.C.) - to 
gain a better understanding of how EU institutions’ approach might have 
evolved over time. Given that the right to mobility encompasses not only 
the rights to move and reside in other Member States, but also to access 
social benefits, I also trace the evolution of their provision to mobile EU 
citizens. I pay close attention to how CEE nationals have been affected by 
changes in the legal frameworks. In the Part III, I summarize my findings 
and reflect on their broader practical and theoretical implications.  
 
II.     FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT RIGHT: DIRECT AND INDIRECT MEASURES  
 
A.  Legal Framework Before the Eastern Enlargement  
 
1. Freedom of Movement Laws Before 2004  
 
The 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community prohibited discrimination in employment, remuneration, and 
working conditions of workers from the then-Member States (Article 69). 
To facilitate creation of the common market, the 1957 Treaty of Rome 
establishing the European Economic Community called for the elimination 
of obstacles to the free movement of persons (Article 363), and for abolition 
of nationality discrimination within the scope of application of the Treaty 
(Article 7). Pursuant to Title III, on the “Free Movement of Persons,” 
mobility pertained to workers only. Hence, nationality discrimination was 
forbidden in the context of “employment, remuneration and other working 
conditions” (Article 48(2))64, and could be limited only on grounds of 
public order, public safety or public health (Article 48(3)). The ECJ defined 
nationality discrimination broadly, to include direct, indirect65, and covert 
measures66. Criteria which applied regardless of nationality constituted 
indirect discrimination if there was a risk that they placed mobile workers at 
a particular disadvantage67- for example, high transfer fees for professional 
                                                 
63 Along with freedoms of movement of goods, capital, and services. 
64 Although Member States were permitted to restrict access to public service posts to 
their own nationals (Article 48(4)).  
65 Case 15/69, Uglolia [1970] ECR 363.  
66 Case 152/73, Sotgiu [1974] ECR 153. 
67 Case C-237/94, O’Flynn v. Adjudication Officer, ECLI:EU:C:1996:206. 
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soccer players68, or residence conditions or language requirements more 
easily satisfied by domestic workers69. Moreover, any limits imposed on 
mobility had to be proportionate to legitimate State goals70.  
Although originally limited to coal and steel workers, the right of free 
movement was gradually expanded through statutes and ECJ decisions to 
include all workers, and some types of economically inactive persons. The 
1993 Maastricht Treaty created the European Union and introduced the 
concept of a common EU citizenship (Article 8). Now “[e]very citizen of 
the Union” – including both economically active and inactive persons - was 
to “have the right to move freely and to reside within the territory of the 
Member States” (Article 8a). Although its scope had to be determined by 
reference to secondary legislation71, the free movement right’s recognition 
at the Treaty level indicated that no arbitrary or disproportionate intrusions 
would be permitted. 
 
a. Workers  
 
Worker status has been a precursor of not only mobility protections, but 
also residence rights, and access to social benefits and tax advantages. 
Noting that the concept must not be interpreted narrowly72, the ECJ has 
gradually expanded this status, to include all who “for a certain period of 
time … perform services for and under the direction of another person in 
return for … remuneration”73. The amount of remuneration is irrelevant, 
and the worker may draw upon public assistance74, as long as the services 
performed are of commercial value to the recipient75. Specific motives for 
undertaking work are irrelevant, so that securing work with the main aim of 
obtaining access to public assistance76 would not disqualify one from 
worker status. Although the economic activity undertaken must be 
                                                 
68 Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association v. Bosman, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:463. 
69 Case C-379/87, Groener v. Minister for Education, ECLI:EU:C:1989:599; Case C-
424/97, Haim v. Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein, ECLI:EU:C:2000:357. 
70 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:493. 
71 The right was subject to “limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty, and by 
measures adopted to give it effect” (Article 8a). 
72 Case C-337/97, Meeusen v. Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:284. 
73 Case 66/85, Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Württemberg, ECLI:EU:C:1986:284. 
74 Case 139/85, Kempf v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:1986:223. 
75 Case 196/87, Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:1988:475. 
76 Case C-413/01, Ninni-Orasche v. Bundesminister für Wissenschaft, Verkehr und 
Kunst, ECLI:EU:C:2003:600. 
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“genuine” and “effective”, rather than “purely marginal or ancillary”77, no 
specific working hours are required. Thus, those employed short-term, 
seasonally, or part-time, and even apprentices and trainees may qualify as 
workers. Working “only a very limited number of hours”, however, may not 
be sufficient78. Self-employed persons have been considered “workers”79. 
The ECJ has defined that status broadly - as working for oneself, being 
solely responsible for one’s own business80, and abiding by applicable 
national regulations (such as any registrations, records keeping, and income 
tax payments). The burden is on the host State to demonstrate sham self-
employment81. 
Noting that “obstacles to the mobility of workers shall be eliminated” 
(Preamble), Regulation 1612/68 on the freedom of movement of workers 
called for equality of treatment between domestic and Community workers 
“in fact and in law in respect of all matters relating to the actual pursuit of 
activities as employed persons and to eligibility for housing”. More 
specifically, it prohibited any discriminatory legal or administrative 
measures which could hinder or restrict those from other Member States 
from undertaking employment (Articles 3 and 4). Employment offices were 
to provide equal assistance to jobseekers from other Member States (Article 
5). Although Member States could request temporary suspension of 
workers’ free movement if undergoing or foreseeing disturbances in the 
labor market “which could seriously threaten the standard of living or level 
of employment in a given region or occupation,” it was up to the 
Commission to authorize such suspension (Article 20). No such request had 
ever been made under the Regulation.  
Directive 68/360 sought to further abolish restrictions on movement and 
residence rights of mobile workers, by simplifying procedures for entering 
and obtaining residence cards in other Member States. For example, host 
States could not charge higher fees for residence permits than dues charged 
for issuance of their citizens’ identity cards (Article 9).  
EU-15 workers’ statutory residence rights were further strengthened by 
the ECJ. For example, the Court had ruled that national residence 
formalities (such as requiring mandatory residence permits) which went 
beyond Directive 68/360’s duty to report one’s presence in the host State 
                                                 
77 Id; Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:1982:105. 
78 Case 357/89, Raulin v. Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, ECLI:EU:C: 
1992:87. 
79 See, e.g., Case C‑214/16, King v. The Sash Window Workshop Ltd, ECLI:EU:C: 
2017:914. 
80 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, ECLI:EU:C:1999: 
126. 
81 Id. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3228025 
7-Aug-18]  RETRACING THE RIGHT TO FREE MOVEMENT 13 
 
(Article 8(2)) were an impermissible obstacle to free movement82. Failing to 
comply with all the formalities of the Directive did not justify workers’ 
expulsion83. Moreover, in Martinez Sala84 (1998), the Court ruled that a 
host State was precluded from requiring nationals of other Member States 
authorized to reside there to produce formal residence permits to receive 
social advantages if the same were not required of its own nationals. To 
reach this decision, the Court relied on Maastricht Treaty’s prohibition of 
nationality discrimination of EU citizens. More generally, any national 
conditions on residency provisions under the Directive had to satisfy the 
proportionality test85.  
Before the Eastern Enlargement, mobility restrictions on workers had 
been imposed only once, during the Southern Enlargement of Greece in 
1981 (for 6 years) and of Spain and Portugal in 1986 (for 7 years; shortened 
to 6 years after Council review). Like the transitional measures during the 
Eastern Enlargement, they relied on explicit derogations of Articles 1 
through 6 of Regulation 1612/68 (pertaining to workers’ right to take up 
employment in other Member States). These earlier restrictions, however, 
were implemented before Maastricht Treaty’s creation of EU citizenship86 
and before the borderless Schengen Area was established through the 1999 
Amsterdam Treaty.  
 
b. Economically Inactive Movers (Including Jobseekers) 
 
Secondary laws slowly expanded former workers’ access to the freedom 
of movement right. According to Directive 68/360, those temporarily 
incapable of work (due to medical issues or accidents) or those involuntarily 
unemployed were not automatically deprived of residence rights (Article 
7(1)). Once a worker had been involuntarily unemployed for more than a 
year, Member States could restrict such former worker’s residence permit 
renewal period, but to no less than 12 months (Article 7(2)). Moreover, 
pursuant to Regulation 1251/70, workers who had reached retirement age or 
had become permanently incapacitated while working in a host State had 
the right to remain there.  
In the 1990s, freedom of movement became also guaranteed through 
secondary laws for students, pensioners, and the unemployed, as well as for 
                                                 
82 Case C-344/95, Commission v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1997:81. 
83 Case 48/75, Royer, ECLI:EU:C:1976:57. 
84 Case C-86/96 Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, ECLI:EU:C:1998:217. 
85 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:493. 
86 The only previous enlargement that took place after Maastricht did not include any 
impediments on mobility (involving Finland, Sweden, and Austria in 1995). 
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their families. This was further reinforced by the Maastricht Treaty’s 
creation of EU citizenship and extension of the right of mobility to all EU 
citizens. However, pursuant to Directives 90/364, 93/96, and 90/365, 
economically inactive movers were required to have comprehensive 
sickness insurance (whether public or private) in the host State, and 
sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social security 
system of the host State during their period of residence. (For students, a 
mere declaration regarding resources sufficed.) “Sufficient resources” 
amounted to at least the level at which host State nationals became eligible 
for social assistance87. In making this determination, personal circumstances 
of each applicant, and easily accessible resources of any type88 were to be 
taken into account.  
The ECJ has been supportive of non-economically active EU citizens’ 
right to reside in other Member States. For example, the Court found that 
jobseekers had a Treaty right to move and reside in other States “for the 
purpose of seeking employment”89. Although host States did have a right to 
expel them if they did not have a “genuine chance” of finding employment, 
jobseekers were afforded a “reasonable time” to conduct their search90 - 
more than three months91, and possibly more than six months92. Moreover, 
EU nationals who became unemployed after having worked in a host 
country were entitled to “the right to look for or pursue an occupation”93. 
The ECJ often drew on Treaty provisions regarding non-discrimination 
and EU citizenship to sidestep some of the limitations on mobility imposed 
by secondary legislation. For example, in Grzelczyk94 (2001), the ECJ 
proclaimed that EU citizenship, as a “fundamental status”, called for 
financial solidarity among all EU citizens. Thus, as long as mobile EU 
nationals were lawfully resident in another State, they could rely on the 
Treaty’s prohibition of nationality discrimination in the context of free 
movement and residence rights. In Baumbast95 (2002), the Court held that 
refusing a former worker residence because his sickness insurance did not 
cover emergency treatment in the host State constituted disproportionate 
                                                 
87 Directive 90/364, Article 1. 
88 Commission of European Communities, Commission Report to Parliament and 
Council on the application of Directives 30/364, 90/365, and 93/96, COM/99/1027/FIN. 
89 Case C-292/89, Antonissen, ECLI:EU:C:1991:80. 
90 Id. 
91 Case C-344/95, Commission v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1997:81. 
92 Case C-292/89, Antonissen, ECLI:EU:C:1991:80. 
93 Case 48/75, Royer, ECLI:EU:C:1976:57. 
94 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk v. le Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-
Neuve, ECLI:EU:C:2001:458. 
95 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:493. 
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interference with the exercise of Treaty rights. Finally, in D’Hoop96 (2002), 
the Court concluded that any penalties on a mobile national’s return to 
home country (such as refusing to grant tide-over allowance due to having 
completed secondary education in another Member State) constituted 
impermissible obstacles to free movement.  
 
c. CEE Nationals 
 
Before the Eastern Enlargement, none of the above rights applied to 
third-country nationals (“TCNs”), such as those from CEE countries. The 
Agreements on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation entered 
into by the Community, existing Member States, and individual CEE states 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s focused on just that – trade, commercial, 
and economic cooperation – with no mention of mobility. This was 
followed by individual Europe Agreements in the 1990s, which approached 
CEE workers like TCNs, and did not provide them with any degree of 
mobility97. Despite the Agreements’ liberalization of the movement of 
capital, goods, and services, sections on the “Movement of Workers, 
Establishment, Supply of Services” did not even mention the right to free 
movement of persons. Instead, existing Member States were permitted to 
continue applying their immigration rules to CEE nationals, although they 
were not permitted to make them more demanding than they had been at the 
time of signing of the Europe Agreements. Since the Agreements did 
nothing to positively facilitate mobility, CEE nationals lawfully resident in 
EU-15 States were there pursuant to a few national regimes and ad hoc 
bilateral agreements that permitted temporary-worker schemes (and 
responded to specific employer needs)98, as refugees, or as family members 
of EU nationals.  
Under Europe Agreements, those lawfully employed in the Member 
States in accordance with their immigration laws99 were entitled to 
protection from nationality-based discrimination (in terms of working 
conditions, remuneration, and dismissal), and could be joined by their 
families (see, e.g., Article 37(1) of Europe Agreement with Poland). 
                                                 
96 Case C-224/98 D'Hoop v. Office national d'emploi, ECLI:EU:C:2002:432. 
97 The only limited exception was pursuant to the right of free establishment, for 
highly-skilled “key personnel” employed by CEE companies operating in EU-15 States. 
98 European Commission, The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of 
Enlargement - Information Note (March 6, 2001). For example, since the early 1990s, 
Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria had bilateral agreements with Germany – all tied to specific 
German labor market needs, and permitting small quotas of temporary workers (ex: 500 
from Romania). 
99 Case C-162/00, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, ECLI:EU:C: 
2002:57. 
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According to the ECJ, these non-discrimination provisions had a direct 
effect, so that they could be relied on by CEE workers before national 
courts100. Moreover, their scope was deemed identical to equality rights 
conferred on EU-15 nationals under Treaty provisions101. Thus, in 
Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, the ECJ struck down a national provision according 
to which positions for foreign-language assistants could be filled through 
fixed-term contracts, whereas for other teaching staff recourse to such 
contracts had to be individually justified. In Kolpak102, the Court concluded 
that a sports federation rule authorizing clubs to field only a limited number 
of players from among TCNs could not be applied to lawfully employed 
CEE athletes.  
Despite the ECJ’s broad application of Europe Agreements’ non-
discrimination clauses, they were of little practical impact because the 
Agreements applied to so few categories of CEE nationals. They did not 
apply to economically inactive persons, jobseekers, or posted workers103. 
They also did not apply to those engaged in informal work arrangements – 
which was popular among CEE nationals104. Self-employed CEE nationals 
relied on non-discrimination provisions under the Agreements’ 
establishment clauses105, and only if they could demonstrate sufficient 
financial resources106. Given income discrepancies between EU and CEE 
states, possessing sufficient resources would have been difficult to prove for 
CEE nationals. In addition, impediments on CEE nationals’ travel to EU-15 
States (close to a ban under Communism, and visa requirements thereafter) 
would have inhibited their chances of establishing networks and possessing 
local know-how necessary to undertake self-employment.  
 
2. Access to Social Benefits by Mobile Individuals Before 2004  
 
The freedom of movement right is also inherently linked to equality in 
the receipt of social benefits and tax advantages107. Thus, since the 1960s, 
                                                 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Case C-438/00, Deutscher Handballbund eV v. Kolpak, ECLI:EU:C:2003:255. 
103 Posted workers have been governed by a separate legal regime. See Directive 96/71 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. 
104 Daniela Andren & Monica Roman, Should I Stay or Should I Go? Romanian 
Migrants during Transition and Enlargements, IZA Discussion Paper No. 8690 (Institute 
for the Study of Labor, 2014); Kubal, supra note 24; Focus Migration, Romania (2008), 
http://focusmigration.hwwi.de/Romania.2515.0.html?&L=1. 
105 Titles IV of the Europe Agreements. 
106 Case C-37/98, The Queen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:224. 
107 European Commission, Free Movement – EU Nationals, http://ec.europa.eu/social/ 
main.jsp?catId=457. 
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secondary laws and ECJ decisions have provided access to social benefits to 
at least some groups of mobile Member State nationals.  
 
a. Workers  
 
Pursuant to Regulation 1612/68, Member States were mandated to treat 
workers from other Member States (from the first day of their employment) 
equally with domestic workers in the provision of social and tax advantages 
(Article 7(2)), and in “matters of housing” (Article 9(1)). Furthermore, 
workers had the right to be joined by their families (Article 10), who were 
to be integrated into host State societies. The Commission advocated this 
Regulation’s broad interpretation108. Moreover, Regulation 1408/71, 
implemented through Regulation 574/72, governed coordination in the 
provision of social security benefits to mobile workers. 
Although Regulation 1612/68 applied to workers only (including 
permanent, seasonal and frontier workers, and those providing services), the 
ECJ had interpreted the concept of “worker” broadly, as discussed earlier. 
“Social advantages”, not defined in the Regulation, were also interpreted 
broadly109 by the ECJ - to cover all the advantages national workers enjoy 
primarily due to their status as workers or as residents in their home States, 
the extension of which seems likely to facilitate mobility110 (regardless of 
whether the specific advantages are linked to employment contracts111). For 
example, they include discretionary benefits112, welfare benefits113, benefits 
granted after employment is terminated114, and at least some benefits not 
directly linked to employment - such as the right to be accompanied in the 
host State by a partner115, the grant of funeral expenses fund116, and 
children’s access to student grants.117 They also encompass rights that 
represent “a significant factor in promoting the integration of the worker 
into the host nation, and thus in achieving the objective of free movement 
                                                 
108 Jaime L. Fuster, Council Regulation 1612/68: A Significant Step in Promoting the 
Right of Freedom of Movement within the EEC, 11 B.C., INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 127 
(1988). 
109 Case 207/78 Even, ECLI:EU:C:1979:144. 
110 See Case C-86/96 Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, ECLI:EU:C:1998:217. 
111 Case 249/83, Hoeckx v. Openbaar Centrum voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn, ECLI: 
EU:C:1985:139. 
112 Case 65/81 Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg, ECLI:EU:C:1982:6. 
113 See Case 249/83, Hoeckx v. Openbaar Centrum voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn, 
ECLI: EU:C:1985:139. 
114 Case C-57/96 Meints v. Minister van Landbouw, ECLI:EU:C:1997:564. 
115 Case 59/85 Netherlands v. Reed, ECLI:EU:C:1986:157. 
116 See Case C-237/94, O’Flynn v. Adjudication Officer, ECLI:EU:C:1996:206. 
117 See Case C-337/97, Meeusen v. Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:284. 
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for workers,” such as the right to have criminal court proceedings in the 
worker’s native language118. Advantages available to workers’ dependents 
are also included119. National tax rules which deter EU citizens from 
exercising the free movement right may constitute an impermissible 
obstacle120 to mobility – for example, denying a refund of excess income 
tax when changing residence to another Member State121. 
 
b. Economically-Inactive Movers (Including Jobseekers)  
 
Even after the extension of EU citizenship to economically inactive EU 
nationals, they were not statutorily provided with access to social benefits. 
However, by the late 1990s, the ECJ became instrumental in extending 
access to social benefits to include such movers, by relying on Treaty non-
discrimination provisions to overstep limitations imposed by secondary EU 
legislation. According to Martinez Sala (1998), all EU citizens lawfully 
resident in another Member State fell under Treaty protections and hence 
were entitled to social benefits, including benefits under Regulations 
1408/71 (social security benefits) and 1612/68 (social and tax 
advantages)122. In Grzelczyk123 (2001), the ECJ derived a principle of 
financial solidarity between all EU citizens based on the Treaty, to preclude 
a national measure which made mobile students’ entitlement to a non-
contributory social benefit (such as a minimum subsistence allowance) 
conditional on demonstrating “sufficient resources” when no such condition 
applied to domestic students. The Court also noted that recourse to social 
assistance could not automatically lead to a denial of residence permit. 
Drawing on its ruling in Grzelczyk, the ECJ held in Bidar (2005)124 that a 
student’s right to reside in the host Member State was primarily regulated 
by Treaty provisions and thus included the right to equal treatment in 
obtaining social assistance benefits (including maintenance grants or loans).  
 
c. CEE Nationals  
 
The only TCNs to whom Regulations 1408/71 and 1612/68 applied 
                                                 
118 Case 137/84 Mutsch, ECLI:EU:C:1985:335. 
119 See Case C-337/97, Meeusen v. Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:284. 
120 Id. 
121 Case C-175/88, Biehl v. Administration des contributions du grand-duché de 
Luxembourg, ECLI:EU:C:1990:186. 
122 See Case C-86/96 Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, ECLI:EU:C:1998:217. 
123 See Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk v. le Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-
Louvain-la-Neuve, ECLI:EU:C:2001:458. 
124 Case C-209/03, R (Bidar) v. London Borough of Ealing, ECLI:EU:C:2005:169. 
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were family members of EU citizens125. During the 1990s, the Commission 
had made several proposals to extend social security protections afforded to 
mobile EU nationals to TCNs lawfully employed in the EU126, but none 
came to fruition. None of the Europe Agreements with CEE states 
addressed social benefits, other than coordinating social security systems 
for workers127. 
 
B.  Legal Regime After 2004, Including in the Aftermath of the Eastern 
Enlargement  
 
1. Freedom of Movement Laws After 2004  
 
Existing regulations and case law pertaining to mobility and residence 
rights were consolidated and replaced by Directive 2004/38 (the “Free 
Movement Directive”), adopted two days before the 2004 enlargement, and 
still in effect. All EU citizens now had the right to reside in other Member 
States for up to three months without any formalities or conditions (Article 
6). Moreover, the Directive extended the right to be joined by family 
members to all mobile EU citizens (Article 3), and granted a new right of 
permanent residence after five years of lawful residence (Articles 16-17). 
Member States were forbidden from requiring movers to hold residence 
permits (Article 25), although they were permitted to compel them to 
register their presence (within a reasonable and non-discriminatory time 
frame) after more than three months (Article 8).  
The Directive strengthened substantive and procedural safeguards 
available to mobile individuals whose rights of free movement or residence 
had been restricted (Article 15). Host States’ ability to deny or terminate 
rights of residence were limited to grounds of public policy, public security, 
and public health (which could not be invoked to serve economic ends) 
(Article 27)128, and fraud or abuse of rights129 (Article 36). Workers, self-
                                                 
125 And refugees under Regulation 1408/71. 
126 European Commission, Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) amending 
Regulation (EEC) N° 1408/71 or the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the 
Community and Regulation (EEC) N° 574/72 laying down the procedure for implementing 
Regulation (EEC) N° 1408/71, COM(91) 528 final OJ 1992; European Commission, 
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 as 
regards its extension to nationals of third countries, COM(97) 561 final OJ 1988 C 6/15. 
127 For example, Article 38 of the Europe Agreement with Poland. 
128 Measures taken on public policy or public security grounds must be proportionate 
and based exclusively on the needs of the host State and the personal conduct of the 
individual (which presents a genuine, present, and serious threat to a fundamental interest 
of the host society) (Article 27). Those taken due to public health must be based on only 
the most serious infectious diseases occurring within three months of arrival (Article 29). 
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employed persons, and jobseekers could only be expelled on grounds of 
public policy or public security (Recital 16). Host States could impose re-
entry bans against those who had been expelled only on grounds of public 
policy, public security, or public health (Article 15(3)). An expulsion 
measure could not be an automatic consequence of recourse to social 
assistance (Article 14(3)). According to the ECJ, expulsion of an EU citizen 
was an exceptional measure, requiring individual examination of each 
specific case130. The proportionality principle applied to any such 
restrictions on mobility (Article 27), and the burden of proof was on the 
host State (EC 2009). 
 
a. Workers  
 
Pursuant to the Free Movement Directive, workers (including self-
employed individuals) had an automatic right to reside in other Member 
States for longer than three months, with no formalities to satisfy (Article 
7(1)). “Worker” status included former workers unable to work due to 
illnesses or accidents (Article 7(3)). Those who became involuntarily 
unemployed after at least a year of employment in a host State retained their 
“worker” status indefinitely - as long as they were registered as jobseekers 
with an employment office (Article 7(2)). If they had worked for less than a 
year, however, they retained “worker” status for at least six months (Article 
7(3)).  
The ECJ continued to define “worker” status broadly. For example, the 
Court ruled in Trojani (2004)131 that performing various jobs for Salvation 
Army which totaled 30 hours a week, as part of a personal reintegration 
program, in return for benefits in kind and some pocket money, constituted 
employment. Even working fewer than 5 ½ hours per week has been found 
sufficient132. Similarly, the ECJ has continued to define “self-employment” 
broadly, as working for oneself, and being solely responsible for one’s own 
business133.  
 
 
                                                                                                                            
129 Fraud or abuse of rights must be directly related to obtaining the rights of free 
movement or residence. See European Commission, supra note 5. 
130 Case C-348/09 P.I. v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid, ECLI:EU:C: 
2012:300. 
131 Case C-456/02, Trojani v. Centre public d'aide sociale de Bruxelles, ECLI:EU:C: 
2004:488. 
132 Case C-14/09, Genc v. Land Berlin, ECLI:EU:C:2010:57. 
133 See Case C‑214/16, King v. The Sash Window Workshop Ltd, ECLI:EU:C: 
2017:914. 
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b. Economically-Inactive Movers  
 
Pursuant to Directive 2004/38, economically inactive movers’ right to 
reside for more than three months is conditioned on having comprehensive 
sickness insurance, and “sufficient resources” so as not to become a burden 
on the social welfare system of the receiving State (Article 7(1)). Member 
States are prohibited from setting a fixed amount below which the right of 
residence can be automatically refused (Article 8(4)). Instead, determining 
“sufficient resources” is to be a fact-intensive process, based on “the 
personal situation of the person concerned” (Article 8), including resources 
from third persons, and both periodic and accumulated capital134. Member 
States are encouraged to carry out proportionality test135 in making this 
determination (Recital 16). The threshold may not be higher than the level 
below which nationals of the host State become eligible for social assistance 
or than the minimum social security pension paid by the host State (Article 
8(4)). What constitutes “sufficient resources” should be interpreted in the 
light of the Directive’s objective, that is, facilitating mobility136. Only the 
actual receipt of social assistance benefits may be considered relevant in 
determining “unreasonable burden,” after considering the duration of such 
benefits receipt, their amount, and each recipient’s personal situation137. 
Although Member States may expel economically inactive movers (unless 
they are permanent residents) if they become an “unreasonable burden”, 
such expulsions may not be an automatic consequence of relying on social 
assistance (Article 14(3)).  
 
c. First-Time Jobseekers  
 
Among all the economically inactive categories, residence rights of 
those who enter another Member State to seek employment have been the 
most complicated. Although jobseekers must demonstrate self-sufficiency 
and having sickness insurance (like all economically non-active groups), 
Article 14(4)(b) prohibits their expulsion as long as they have a “genuine 
chance” of finding employment – that is, as long as they continue to 
demonstrate some prospects of finding employment, even after searching 
for more than six months138. Because jobseekers can only be expelled on 
grounds of public policy or public security, in practice, first-time jobseekers 
                                                 
134 See European Commission, supra note 5. 
135 Adequacy of insurance must also be determined in accordance with proportionality 
principle. See id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 See Case C-292/89, Antonissen, ECLI:EU:C:1991:80. 
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have the right to reside without having to prove self-sufficiency139.  
 
d. CEE Nationals  
 
Although EU citizenship has always been differentiated by statutory and 
case law, pre-2004 distinctions had privileged workers over those 
economically inactive. The Eastern Enlargement temporarily reversed that 
hierarchy in the context of CEE nationals. Although empirical studies at the 
time of the Enlargement had predicted that EU-15 States would benefit 
economically from CEE workers’ mobility, and that CEE movers would not 
rely heavily on host States’ welfare systems140, all Accession Treaties141 
expressly blocked application of Treaty Article 39(2), which had abolished 
discrimination of mobile workers in the context of employment. Member 
States could derogate for up to seven years from Articles 1 through 6 of 
Regulation 1612/68 (pertaining to mobility of economically active persons), 
and from provisions of Directive 68/360 (pertaining to mobile workers’ 
residence rights). Transitional restrictions also limited access of workers’ 
families to EU-15 labor markets142. Accession Treaties were silent about 
residence and citizenship rights143, and did not offer any justification for 
these derogations.  
EU-15 States were provided wide discretion in restricting CEE workers’ 
mobility during the entire seven-year transitional periods. For the first two 
years after accession, EU-15 States could continue to apply their pre-
accession national measures or bilateral agreements144, as long as employers 
                                                 
139 Case C-138/02, Collins v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:172; Case C-258/04, Office national de l'emploi v. Ioannidis, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:559. 
140 Tito Boeri & Herbert Brücker, Why Are Europeans so Tough on Migrants?, 
ECONOMIC POLICY 629-703 (2005); European Commission, Employment in Europe 2008 
(2008); European Parliament, Resolution on the Transitional Arrangements Restricting the 
Free Movement of Workers on EU Labour Markets, 2006/2036 INI, C 293 E/230; Elena 
Jileva, Visa and Free Movement of Labour: the uneven imposition of the EU acquis on the 
accession states, 28(4) JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 83-700 (2002); 
Stalford, supra note 56. 
141 E.g., Annex XII of the Accession Treaty with Poland; Annex VI to the Act of 
Accession with Bulgaria. 
142 This treatment was less favorable than the family reunification rights conferred on 
TCNs pursuant to Directive 2003/86, and less favorable than the rights conferred by the 
Europe Agreements. This approach also was likely in conflict with ECJ case law stemming 
from the transitional measures imposed during Greece’s accession in 1981. See Case C-
77/82, Peskeloglou v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, ECLI:EU:C:1983:92. 
143 Moreover, there was not much discussion of these concepts in their legislative 
histories. 
144 As long as they were not more restrictive than those in force on the day of signing 
the Accession Treaties. 
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gave priority to all EU workers (including CEE workers) over TCNs. 
Before the end of the initial two-year phase, the Council was to “review” 
the functioning of transitional arrangements – but this “review” had no 
binding effect145. In practice, Member States could decide unilaterally to 
continue imposing their national measures during the second (three-year) 
phase, after simply notifying the Commission. Thereafter, States which had 
been applying restrictive measures had the discretion to continue applying 
them for two additional years “in case of serious disturbances” of their labor 
markets or merely in response to “a threat thereof”, after notifying the 
Commission. No prior authorization by any EU body was required, and 
neither the Commission’s role nor the concept of “serious disturbances” 
was ever clarified146. Most Member States relied on transitional measures, 
during both parts of the Eastern Enlargement147. 
In addition, any Member State that had not initially applied transitional 
restrictions could request at any point before the end of the seven-year 
periods that the Commission authorize mobility derogations if it 
experienced or merely could “foresee disturbances” of its labor market 
“which could seriously threaten the standard of living or the level of 
employment in a given region or occupation” – to be in place until the 
situation was restored to “normal”. Again, none of the key terms were 
defined. Moreover, in “urgent and exceptional” cases, Member States could 
unilaterally suspend application of the free movement acquis at any point 
before the end of the seven-year periods. In the end, none of these 
provisions were applied in the aftermath of the 2004 enlargement. However, 
Spain obtained the Commission’s authorization to suspend free movement 
of workers from Romania between August 2011 and December 2013, after 
having opened up its labor market in 2009. Although to obtain such 
authorization, a Member State was required to support its “convincing” 
arguments with specific data rather than merely citing unemployment 
                                                 
145 Monika Byrska, The Unfinished Enlargement: Report on Free Movement of People 
in EU-25 (European Citizen Action Service 2004). 
146 Adelina Adinolfi, Free Movement and Access to Work of Citizens of the New 
Member States: The Transitional Measures, 42 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 469-98 
(2005). 
147 After the 2004 enlargement, during the first phase (2004-06), all EU-15 States other 
than Ireland, the UK, and Sweden imposed direct mobility restrictions (Ireland and the UK 
also imposed limitations on access to social benefits); during 2006-09, additional nine 
Member States opened their labor markets; Austria and Germany were the only two states 
to have continued direct restrictions after 2009. After the 2007 enlargement, during the first 
phase (2007-09), Hungary, and all EU-15 states except Finland and Sweden imposed 
restrictions. UK, Ireland, Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg maintained restrictions until the end of 2013. Moreover, after invoking 
safeguard clause, Spain imposed restrictions between 2011 and 2013. 
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rates148, Spain was given permission based on unemployment rates alone (of 
both its own nationals and Romanian nationals in Spain)149.  
Transitional mobility restrictions were not challengeable under EU law. 
Article 18 of the Treaty allows for limitations of the free movement right150. 
Moreover, the ECJ did not have jurisdiction to challenge their legality 
because they were an integral part of the Accession Treaties, and hence 
primary law151. Of course, since provisions limiting the freedom of 
movement right must be interpreted strictly, the Commission could have in 
theory brought infringement procedures against Member States for 
imposing measures that were overly broad152. No such procedures were 
initiated. 
Although transitional mobility derogations did not apply to persons 
other than workers, CEE nationals’ access to mobility was severely 
impeded by them. Transitional restrictions did not apply to economically 
inactive individuals, as long as they could demonstrate financial self-
sufficiency and health insurance coverage. These conditions likely served as 
a significant impediment for CEE nationals, due to CEE states’ lower 
GDPs153. Transitional mobility derogations also did not apply to self-
employed persons154. Although legally not a very onerous standard to 
satisfy, as discussed above, becoming self-employed requires financial 
resources and familiarity with local markets. These hurdles would have 
been difficult for CEE nationals to overcome. Moreover, transitional 
measures also did not apply to CEE nationals who had already been 
                                                 
148 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council on the 
Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements on Free Movement of Workers from 
Bulgaria and Romania, SEC(2011) 1343 final.  
149 European Commission, Decision of 20 December 2012 authorising Spain to extend 
the temporary suspension of the application of Articles 1 to 6 of Regulation (EU) No 
492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Union with regard to Romanian workers (2012/831/EU), OJEU L 
356/90. 
150 “Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this 
Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect.” 
151 See Cases C-31/86 and 35/86 Levantina Agricola Industrial SA v. Council, 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:211.  
152 European Commission, Report on the First Phase (1 January 2007 – 31 December 
2008) of the Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2005 Accession Treaty and as 
Requested According to the Transitional Arrangement set out in the 2003 Accession 
Treaty, COM(2008) 765 final. 
153 For example, see Eurostat, GDP and household accounts at regional level (2012), 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:GDP_and_ 
household_accounts_at_regional_level&oldid=81499. 
154 Transitional restrictions also did not apply to posted workers, who were governed 
by a separate legal regime. 
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working lawfully in EU-15 States for an uninterrupted period of at least 12 
months prior to accession155, but the rights of such workers could be limited 
at the discretion of the receiving States. This provision carried little 
practical significance given how few CEE nationals had access to lawful 
employment opportunities before the Enlargement, and their propensity to 
engage in short-term migration156 and informal employment157, thus lacking 
an uninterrupted 12-month period of employment.  
 
2. Access to Social Benefits After 2004  
 
a. Workers  
 
From day one of qualifying as a “worker” in a receiving State, access to 
that State’s social security benefits158 (Regulation 883/2004159, Article 3), 
social and tax advantages (Regulation 1612/68, Article 7(2)), and social 
assistance (Directive 2004/38, Article 24(2)) followed.  
The ECJ continued to support workers’ receipt of all these benefits. 
Drawing on Grzelczyk, in Trojani (2004), the Court pointed out that a 
worker’s receipt of social assistance could not automatically lead to 
removal due to termination of the right to residence. In Hartmann160 (2007), 
the Court expanded the term “worker” to include frontier workers, for the 
purposes of social advantages. And in Renneberg161 (2008), a national rule 
not allowing workers to offset tax income from one State with tax loss from 
another State was found impermissible under the Treaty’s guarantee of 
freedom of movement. 
 
b. Economically Inactive Movers (Including First-Time Jobseekers)  
 
Drawing support from Treaty’s provisions on EU citizenship and 
equality, the ECJ has continued to expand the rights of jobseekers and 
                                                 
155 And did not move to another Member State within the first 12 months after 
accession. 
156 See Stalford, supra note 56. 
157 See Kubal, supra note 24. 
158 These are contributory benefits, including old-age pensions, survivor’s pensions, 
disability benefits, sickness benefits, birth grants, unemployment benefits, family 
allowances, and healthcare benefits; and SNCBs (mixed type of benefits, between social 
assistance and social security), such as income support in the UK or jobseeker’s allowance 
in Ireland (Regulation 883/2004, Article 3). Non-contributory benefits fall outside EU 
law’s scope. 
159 Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems. It replaced 
Regulation 1408/71, continuing its general framework. 
160 Case C-212/05, Hartmann v. Freistaat Bayern, ECLI:EU:C:2007:437. 
161 Case C-527/06, Renneberg v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, ECLI:EU:C:2008:566. 
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economically inactive mobile EU citizens, thus overcoming some of the 
distinctions between economically active and inactive movers under 
secondary legislation.  
Under the Directive, after the first three months of residence (during 
which host States could deny access to social assistance benefits (Article 
24)), economically inactive movers were granted equal access to social 
assistance, as long as they could demonstrate self-sufficiency so that they 
did not lose their right to reside. The Court in Trojani (2004), however, 
expanded this right. It noted that since the right to reside in other Member 
States is conferred directly on every EU citizen by the Treaty, all mobile 
individuals are entitled to receive social assistance (non-contributory 
benefits) on the same conditions as host State nationals, even if they do not 
satisfy residence requirements under secondary legislation. Due to financial 
solidarity between all EU citizens, lacking sufficient resources was found 
not to prevent mobile persons from having access to all rights stemming 
from EU citizenship, including the right to equality in access to social 
assistance.  
Although pursuant to Article 24(2) of the Directive, Member States 
were permitted not to grant first-time jobseekers from other Member States 
any social assistance for as long as they remained in that status, the ECJ 
mandated that they be given equal access to unemployment social 
assistance and other financial benefits “intended to facilitate access to the 
labour market”162. Which specific national benefits “facilitate” labor market 
access depends on the benefits’ results, rather than their formal structure163. 
Member States could require prospective workers to demonstrate a “real 
link” with the host country’s labor market to access such benefits. This 
could be satisfied where a jobseeker had genuinely sought work for a 
reasonable time period and had a “genuine chance” of finding 
employment164. This test was to be broad and flexible - not met only when it 
was inconceivable that a jobseeker could establish a real link165. Thus, for 
example, in Ioannidis (2005), a single requirement based on the place where 
a jobseeker had completed secondary education was found too general and 
restrictive to serve as a test of “real link”166. More recently, the ECJ has 
pointed out that genuinely having sought work (as demonstrated, for 
example, by being invited to job interviews, registering with employment 
                                                 
162 Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08, Vatsouras and Koupatantze v. ARGE, ECLI: EU:C: 
2009:150. 
163 Id. 
164 See Case C-138/02, Collins v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:172; see also Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08, Vatsouras and Koupatantze v. 
ARGE, ECLI: EU:C: 2009:150. 
165 See Case C-258/04, Office national de l'emploi v. Ioannidis, ECLI:EU:C:2005:559. 
166 Id. 
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agencies, and participating in their events) for a reasonable period, even 
without having ever worked in the host State, suffices167. Any residence 
conditions such as the “genuine link” test must be applied under the 
principle of proportionality168. Thus, in its statutory interpretation, the ECJ 
had privileged jobseekers among other types of economically inactive 
movers. However, the test also endorses implicit discrimination of EU 
movers as opposed to domestic workers, since the latter automatically tend 
to have links with their home States169. 
Social and tax advantages were not available to jobseekers under 
Regulation 1612/68. However, in Collins (2004)170, the ECJ ruled that only 
first-time jobseekers were excluded from access to social advantages, 
whereas those who had already entered the labor market were eligible for 
the same social and tax advantages (such as unemployment benefits) as 
national workers. Since jobseekers fell within Treaty provisions on free 
movement of workers, they were to be afforded equal treatment – including 
in access to financial benefits for the unemployed. The Court also noted that 
although EU law did not preclude national legislation which makes 
entitlement to unemployment benefits conditional on a residence 
requirement, it had to satisfy the proportionality test. 
Pursuant to Regulation 883/2004 (Article 3 and Annex X), SNCBs 
(types of social security benefits171 which are considered social assistance), 
were also made available to jobseekers, but only those deemed “habitually 
resident” in the host State. Habitual residence was a factual determination, 
based on factors including the duration and continuity of residence, mover’s 
residence intentions, family status, housing, employment history, and tax 
payments (Regulation 987/09). 
 
c. CEE Nationals  
 
For CEE nationals lawfully residing in EU-15 States, EU law mandated 
that they have equal access to all the social benefits discussed above. 
Moreover, A-8 workers (including those self-employed) were entitled to 
                                                 
167 Case C-367/11, Prete v. Office national de l'emploi, ECLI:EU:C:2012:501. 
168 See Case C-138/02, Collins v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:172. 
169 Charlotte O’Brien, Real links, abstract rights and false alarms: The relationship 
between the ECJ’s ‘real link’ case law and national solidarity, 33 EUROPEAN LAW REV. 
643 (2008). 
170 Id.; see also Case C-258/04, Office national de l'emploi v. Ioannidis, ECLI:EU: 
C:2005:559. 
171 These are contributory benefits, including old-age pensions, survivor’s pensions, 
disability benefits, sickness benefits, birth grants, unemployment benefits, family 
allowances, and healthcare benefits (Regulation 883/2004, Article 3). 
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equality of treatment in access to social security (both non-contributory and 
contributory) under Regulation 1408/71, explicitly mentioned in the A-8 
Accession Treaties172.  
Nothing in the Accession Treaties provided Member States the right to 
impose restrictions in addition to the mobility derogations from Articles 1 
through 6 of Regulation 1612/68, which were “exhaustive”173. Any 
additional restrictions would have been subject to the general equality 
principles under the Treaty. However, after the 2004 enlargement, all EU-
15 States other than Sweden adopted new restrictions, for up to seven years, 
on post-2004 CEE movers’ access to social assistance, social security 
benefits, or social advantages, including delays in providing such access 
even once labor market access was granted174. Similar restrictions were 
applied after the 2007 enlargement.  
The Commission brought infringement proceedings against the UK175  
for applying a new habitual residence test to bar not only jobseekers but 
also unemployed persons from eligibility for social security benefits and 
social advantages for the first twelve months of employment even if they 
had retained worker status under EU law. The ECJ dismissed the case, 
however, after finding the UK approach proportionate (due to being based 
on individual assessments) and tied to a legitimate need to protect public 
finances176. This was one of the earliest indications of the ECJ’s becoming 
more responsive to Member States’ arguments about CEE nationals’ alleged 
welfare tourism.  
 
C.  Legal Regime Since Transitional Mobility Derogations Had Expired  
 
1. Freedom of Movement Law  
 
Directive 2004/38 continues to be in force today, connecting the rights 
of residence, mobility, and social assistance benefits. In the last few years, 
there have been no changes in EU institutions’ approach toward the 
Directive’s basic principles on free movement and residence rights, except 
                                                 
172 For example, Annex II, ¶ 13 of the Accession Treaty with Poland. Austria was 
excluded from this obligation. 
173 NICOLA ROGERS & RICK SCANNELL, FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN THE 
ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION (2005). 
174 For example, under the Worker Registration Scheme in the UK, CEE workers did 
not have right of residence (and hence no access to benefits) until they completed twelve 
months of consecutive employment. 
175 The Commission also initiated infringement procedures against Austria, Germany, 
and Sweden, focusing on transitional limitations on the rights of CEE movers’ family 
members. 
176 Case C-308/14, Commission v. United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:2016:436. 
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for the ECJ’s imposition of limitations on residence rights of economically 
inactive movers.  
 
a. Workers 
 
Regulation 492/2011 replaced Regulation 1612/68 to mandate equality 
of mobile workers and jobseekers in the context of employment, including 
social and tax advantages (Article 7(2)). Adopted to improve application of 
Regulation 492/2011, Directive 2014/54 calls on Member States to 
strengthen redress mechanisms for workers suffering discrimination or 
infringement of their right to free movement (Article 3), and to designate 
bodies to support equal treatment of EU workers and their families (Article 
4). These recent laws expanded the EU’s conceptual approach to mobility: 
Regulation 492/2011 defines the right to free movement as including “all 
matters relating to the actual pursuit of activities as employed persons,” as 
well as “conditions for the integration of the worker’s family” (Recital (6)); 
and Directive 2014/54 denounces any “unjustified restrictions and 
obstacles” to mobility (Article 3). 
The ECJ continues to define the concept of “worker” broadly. For 
example, in Saint-Prix (2014)177, the Court extended worker status to a 
woman who had stopped working due to late stages of pregnancy and the 
effects of childbirth - as long as she would return to work within a 
“reasonable” time (to be determined based on specific factual 
circumstances). Moreover, the Court noted that Directive 2004/38 cannot 
limit the scope of “worker” status under the Treaty. In its 2013 L.N. 
decision, Case C-46/12, relying on the Treaty, the ECJ ruled that 
motivations for undertaking work abroad are irrelevant to the definition of 
“worker.” Thus, the Court allowed a full-time student employed part-time 
to have worker status, despite the fact that he might have entered the host 
State with the intention to study rather than to work. 
Transitional mobility restrictions were imposed on workers from 
Croatia after its accession in 2013. Moreover, any future accession treaties 
have been predicted to include permanent labor mobility safeguards178. As 
stated by the Council President in the Conclusions of the European Council 
summit held in 2016, any future enlargements will include “appropriate 
transitional measures concerning free movement of persons”179. The 
                                                 
177 Case C-507/12, Jessy Saint Prix v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2007. 
178 Editorial Board, The Free Movement of Persons in the European Union: Salvaging 
the Dream while Explaining the Nightmare, 51 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 729-40 
(2014). 
179 European Council, Presidency Conclusions (February 18-19, 2016), EUCO 1/16, 
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Commission did not express a view on this approach. 
 
b. Economically Inactive Persons (Including Jobseekers)  
 
In the last few years, the ECJ has been reading secondary legislation 
narrowly rather than interpreting Treaty provisions expansively, to limit 
residence rights of economically inactive movers. In Brey (2013), the Court 
suggested that an economically inactive mover’s entitlement to a means-
tested SNCB benefit (such as compensatory supplement benefit) could be 
an indication of not having sufficient resources. Thus, such person’s right to 
residence under Directive 2004/38 for longer than three months could be in 
question – to be determined through an individual examination. After Dano 
(2014)180, however, economically inactive individuals’ application for 
social assistance benefits results in automatically losing their right to reside 
due to lacking sufficient resources. 
 
c. CEE Nationals  
 
The above provisions fully apply to CEE nationals since transitional 
mobility restrictions had come to an end. Given that CEE nationals’ 
mobility has been primarily motivated by employment opportunities in EU-
15 States, measures that have decreased jobseekers’ rights have been 
especially detrimental to their enjoyment of the free movement right. EU 
institutions’ prioritizing worker status has likely put pressure on jobseekers 
to take up any available employment options, including those in flexible 
arrangements. 
To support CEE nationals’ residence rights in host States, the ECJ has 
ruled that their periods of lawful residence in EU-15 States before the 
Eastern Enlargement must be taken into account for the purpose of 
acquisition of permanent residence181. 
 
2. Access to Social Benefits Since 2014  
 
In the last few years, there have been no statutory changes in provisions 
on mobile persons’ access to social benefits. Directive 2004/38 continues to 
govern access to social assistance, and Regulation 883/2004 dictates the 
coordination of workers’ access to social security benefits. Regulation 
492/2011 replaced Regulation 1612/68, without changing its provisions on 
                                                                                                                            
ANNEX I, 24. 
180 Case C-333/13, Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358. 
181 Cases C-424/10 and C-425/10, Ziolkowski and Szeja v. Land Berlin, ECLI:EU:C: 
2011:866. 
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workers’ access to social and tax advantages (Article 7(2)). The ECJ, 
however, has been limiting economically inactive movers’ access to 
benefits. 
 
a. Workers  
 
As stated in the Conclusions of the European Council summit in 2016, 
the ECJ opposes restricting economically-active movers’ rights to social 
assistance182. In addition to continuing to define the concept of “worker” 
broadly, as discussed above, the ECJ has been strengthening workers’ 
access to social assistance. For example, in Saint-Prix (2014)183, the Court 
recognized entitlement to income support (a type of SNCB) of a woman 
who had stopped working due to pregnancy and childbirth.  
The Council and the Commission, however, have been more responsive 
to Member States’ concerns about limiting access to social benefits, even of 
workers. This became especially evident during David Cameron’s 
renegotiation of the UK’s membership in the EU. Essentially, Cameron was 
seeking to extend the application of Dano and Alimanovic, to reduce even 
workers’ access to social security. According to the Council, “Member 
States have the right to define the fundamental principles of their social 
security systems and enjoy a broad margin of discretion to define and 
implement their social and employment policy, including setting the 
conditions for access to welfare benefits”184 (2016, Annex I, at 19). To 
facilitate granting States greater discretion, the Council declared its 
intention to submit proposals to amend secondary legislation, including 
Regulation 883/2004 (on the coordination of social security systems) so that 
child benefits claims could be indexed by host States to benefits levels in 
the place of child’s residence; and Regulation 492/2011, to provide an “alert 
and safeguard mechanism that responds to situations of inflow of workers 
from other Member States of an exceptional magnitude over an extended 
period of time, including as a result of past policies following previous EU 
enlargements”185. The only limitation would be that EU workers must not 
be treated less favorably than TCNs. The Commission was in support of 
these proposals186. Although these Conclusions were reached in the context 
of the UK’s renegotiation of its membership, due to what the Commission 
had acknowledged to be “conditions of necessity” brought about by large 
                                                 
182 European Council, supra note 179. 
183 See Case C-507/12, Jessy Saint Prix v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 
ECLI: EU:C:2014:2007. 
184 European Council, supra note 179, Section D. 
185 Id. at 23. 
186 Id. at 33-34. 
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influx of movers into the UK, they nevertheless indicate EU institutions’ 
openness toward prioritizing EU-15 States’ concerns and limiting even 
workers’ access to benefits. Critically, it is not clear what evidence the UK 
had presented to warrant such conclusions, which are incompatible with 
free movement and anti-discrimination provisions of EU law. The 
Commission simply declared that “the kind of information provided” to it 
by the UK showed “the type of exceptional situation that the proposed 
safeguard mechanism is intended to cover exists in the United Kingdom 
today.”187 This is despite having concluded in 2013 that there was little 
evidence of benefit tourism across the EU, but only evidence of economic 
benefits to the receiving States, especially the UK.188 Thus, it is likely that 
both the Commission and the Council subscribe to one of the key 
misconceptions about the effects of free movement – that it negatively 
affects host States’ public purse. 
 
b. Economically Inactive Persons (Including Jobseekers)  
 
Whereas in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the ECJ had provided 
economically inactive EU citizens with access to some social benefits not 
accessible under secondary legislation, the Court has been retracting on this 
approach in the last few years. Having become more sensitive to EU-15 
States’ concerns about benefit tourism, the Court has been narrowly reading 
secondary legislation rather than relying on Treaty provisions. After Dano 
(2014)189, Member States do not have to provide access to SNCBs to 
economically inactive EU citizens (or at least those who, like the petitioner, 
had never been employed in the receiving States and were not searching for 
work). Moreover, those who apply for social assistance benefits 
automatically lose their right to reside, without the need for an individual 
assessment. Thus, in practice, economically inactive persons lack the right 
to equal treatment in the provision of social assistance. Despite fundamental 
rights stemming from EU citizenship, Member States may attach conditions 
of residence from Directive 2004/38 to the provision of SNCBs with a 
social assistance component, and thus exclude access to them even if they 
                                                 
187 European Commission, Declaration of the European Commission on the Safeguard 
Mechanism referred to in paragraph 2(b) of Section D of the Decision of the Heads of State 
or Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning a new settlement for the 
United Kingdom within the European Union, Annex VI to the European Council 
conclusions of 18–19 Feb. 2016, EUCO 1/16, CO EUR 1, CONCL 1. 
188 European Commission, A fact finding analysis on the impact on the Member 
States’ social security systems of the entitlements of non-active intra-EU migrants to 
special non-contributory cash benefits and healthcare granted on the basis of residence, 
Final report, Oct. 2013. 
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are available under Regulation 883/2004.  
Despite the Commission’s obvious opposition, in Commission v. United 
Kingdom (2016)190, the ECJ extended Dano’s exclusion of SNCBs to all 
social security benefits (including family benefits), not just those with a 
social assistance element. The ECJ imported Dano’s approach of not 
requiring an individual assessment, and Brey’s principle of permitting 
Member States to impose conditions (such as the UK’s right-to-reside 
requirements) on economically inactive persons to be eligible for SNCBs 
into Article 4 of Regulation 883/2004 (regarding equality of treatment in the 
receipt of social security benefits, such as child benefits and child tax 
credits). Moreover, the Court reversed its prior approach regarding burden 
of proof, so that Member States are now presumed to be acting in a lawful 
non-discriminatory manner in denying access to social benefits as long as 
they justify their actions based on protecting their public finances.   
The ECJ also narrowed the scope of fundamental Treaty principles by 
applying secondary EU legislation limitations in Alimanovic (2015)191, an 
even stricter application of Directive 2004/38 than Dano. Despite research 
evidence to the contrary, the Court in Alimanovic accepted EU-15 States’ 
“welfare magnet” argument, and concluded that even if individual social 
assistance claims did not place an “unreasonable burden” on national social 
security systems, Member States could argue that accumulated claims 
would do so. Thus, States were entitled to prevent mobile jobseekers’ 
access to certain SNCBs (which constitute social assistance under Directive 
2004/38, but are not benefits of financial nature intended to facilitate access 
to the labor market). Moreover, although Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38 
allowed former workers to retain their status for six months after becoming 
unemployed, the ECJ concluded that after that period, they could claim 
social assistance only if their right of residence was based on more than the 
non-expulsion provision of Article 14(4) (continuing to seek employment).  
The Court in Alimanovic also narrowly construed the “intended to 
facilitate access to the labour market” test, so that only benefits that are 
necessary to jobseekers’ ability to access the labor market fall outside the 
scope of Article 24(2), and thus cannot be withheld during the first three 
months of residence or to first-time jobseekers. Moreover, the Court ruled 
that expulsion decisions due to presenting an unreasonable burden on a 
national social assistance system did not require individual assessments. 
                                                 
190 Case C-308/14, Commission v. United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:2016:436. 
191 Case C-67/14, Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v. Alimanovic, ECLI:EU:C:2015:597. 
The petitioner could not be categorized as retaining worker status under Article 7(3)(c) 
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This stance was reiterated in Garcia-Nieto (2016), in which the ECJ held 
that jobseekers never have access to unemployment benefits even if they 
facilitate access to the labor market because such benefits have a social 
assistance element. Thus, their primary aim is the preservation of dignity 
rather than facilitation of access to the labor market. Consequently, 
jobseekers can be automatically excluded from access to social assistance 
even in the first three months of residence. 
 
c. CEE Nationals  
 
In the last few years, the ECJ has reduced access of economically 
inactive movers to benefits, and other EU branches have considered 
diminishing even workers’ access in response to EU-15 concerns about 
alleged welfare tourism. Such measures have generally had more impact on 
movers who are poor or not employable as highly-skilled workers in the 
receiving States. Jobseeker limitations on access to social benefits 
especially impact CEE nationals since they have access to fewer financial 
resources than EU-15 nationals, and tend to be employed in temporary, 
flexible, and semi-legal arrangements192. 
 
III.     CONCLUSION 
 
The UK’s Brexit referendum had exposed immigration and free 
movement debates to wider public, political, and media scrutiny – 
oftentimes filled with inaccurate or misleading statements. Such erroneous 
myths have vilified movers, degraded their ability to integrate in host 
Member States, and increased strife between locals and movers. Although 
not often mentioned in those debates, the UK has been chipping away at the 
right to mobility for decades – through not belonging to the Schengen area, 
various immigration opt-outs, and the imposition of indirect transitional 
mobility derogations after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. What also has 
been lacking from debates is how the EU has been approaching the right to 
free movement, and what limits on mobility it has accepted. In order for 
Brexit negotiations to be more responsive to the reality of mobility, for the 
pubic to understand this right and the aftermath of Brexit, and for improved 
future contestations over immigration in other Member States, it is 
important that politicians and the media address immigration more 
responsibly, and that the evolution of the right to free movement is 
understood correctly. 
As discussed in this Article, although originally limited to workers, by 
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the 1990s, the free movement right was gradually expanded via Treaty 
provisions, statutes, and ECJ decisions to beyond what is necessary for the 
functioning of the single market - to encompass former workers, jobseekers, 
and eventually all EU-15 citizens. Relying heavily on the post-Maastricht 
concept of EU citizenship as not linked to the market economy, the ECJ 
also expanded access to residence rights and social benefits to economically 
inactive EU-15 nationals, going beyond limitations imposed by secondary 
laws. As both legislation and ECJ decisions shifted the focus from the 
concept of economically active participants in the single market to EU 
citizenship, even economically inactive EU-15 nationals gained access to 
equal treatment and integration measures. While EU-15 nationals’ access to 
free movement and to social benefits was being expanded, CEE nationals’ 
ability to enter EU-15 States was very restricted. Before the Eastern 
Enlargement, CEE nationals’ mobility was limited to bilateral agreements 
that provided for movement of small numbers of workers to satisfy specific 
economic needs in EU-15 States. The Europe Agreements did not facilitate 
mobility, and their right to equal treatment in the employment context 
applied to very few categories of CEE workers. The abolition of the 
requirement for entry visas to EU-15 States in 2001 led to a de facto influx 
of CEE labor migrants. As TCNs, CEE nationals were not entitled mobility 
protections or access to social benefits in EU-15 States. 
Despite an overall expansion of protections of free movement and 
residence rights, statutory differentiation between the rights of workers and 
of economically inactive citizens continued after 2004. The rights of 
workers, former workers, and jobseekers were getting increased protections 
through both statutes and ECJ decisions. Due to transitional post-accession 
derogations, EU-15 Member States could limit their labor market access to 
EU-15 nationals only. CEE workers and jobseekers could be treated akin to 
TCNs. Continuing its trend from before 2004, the ECJ relied on Treaty 
provisions to also expand rights of economically inactive citizens, once 
again going beyond statutory limitations. The European Parliament was 
supportive of this approach193. Although CEE nationals who were self-
employed or economically inactive were granted the same EU rights as 
mobile EU-15 nationals, in practice, few were able to benefit from such 
rights due to financial constraints.  
Since transitional arrangements had come to an end, CEE nationals have 
benefited from increasing statutory and ECJ protections of workers’ 
residence and social benefits rights. All EU institutions appear to have 
become more responsive, however, to EU-15 States’ concerns about welfare 
tourism by CEE nationals. Starting with Dano in 2014 (the same year that 
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transitional limitations on A-2 workers and jobseekers’ mobility had come 
to an end), the ECJ broke from its precedent and began to diminish 
residence rights and access to social benefits of jobseekers and 
economically inactive individuals, by narrowly applying secondary laws. 
References to Treaty provisions, EU citizenship rights, or financial 
solidarity—which had permeated pre-Dano case law—are no longer part of 
the ECJ’s decisions. Consequently, CEE jobseekers and economically 
inactive movers are facing increasing impediments. The reasoning and 
outcomes in these recent cases indicate that EU citizenship depends on 
participation in the market, so that poor and economically inactive EU 
citizens do not enjoy the same rights as those who are employed or have 
resources.  
Current mobility laws discourage movement of jobseekers and those 
who lack access to financial resources. By privileging worker status, the 
current legal framework reduces worker autonomy as it likely encourages 
efforts to obtain employment soon upon arrival in host States or even 
before, and thus increases reliance on employment agencies and willingness 
to accept temporary or flexible work arrangements. It also negatively affects 
workers who become unemployed, especially those who are poor. Recent 
impediments in economically inactive movers’ access to social benefits are 
likely to have greater impact on CEE than EU-15 mobile nationals due to 
the formers’ propensity to engage in irregular, poorly paid employment, 
more recent labor market access in EU-15 States, and lesser access to 
financial resources from home. By providing Member States with discretion 
to withhold equal access to social benefits without terminating residence 
right, the ECJ has created a class of economically inactive EU citizens who 
cannot be expelled but have no entitlement to social assistance. Moreover, 
Member States have been provided discretion to define work status 
narrowly, thus leading to withholding benefits from workers on low 
incomes and in flexible, insecure work arrangements – more and more 
prevalent in today’s economies. The EU has not acknowledged today’s 
labor market patterns in its legal framework. Because immigrants, 
especially those from poorer states, tend to concentrate in low-pay, less 
secure jobs, they have been especially impacted. Since the economic crisis 
of 2008, part-time, flexible, insecure employment options have proliferated 
in the EU194; and inequalities have been increasing across the EU195. 
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Precarious employment, very often undertaken by CEE workers in EU-15 
States, becomes even more precarious as a result of the increasing 
divergence between EU rhetoric and EU rights, further weakened due to 
Member State discretion. This has had an especially negative impact on 
CEE workers. For example, Dwyer et al. have documented that the 
imposition of the UK’s post-accession Worker Registration Scheme had 
made them especially susceptible to forced labor196. Such effects were 
likely amplified in the twelve EU-15 States that had imposed direct post-
accession mobility restrictions on CEE nationals. O’Brien197 has called this 
“a triumph of capitalist reasoning”: the creation of a non-national working 
poor class, responsive to labor market fluctuations, yet with few 
entitlements to the public purse. Ultimately, this will have consequences for 
all low-skill workers, foreign and local, increasing socio-economic 
inequalities, and increasing resultant social costs – homelessness, poor 
health, increased crime, and decreased social cohesion and trust.  
Perhaps it is thus not surprising that EU institutions’ praise of mobility 
has often been tied to economic benefits rather than to values such as 
human dignity. Functioning as “one and undivided economic workforce”, 
“European citizens should ‘move’, because their ‘movement’ prospers the 
development of ‘human resources’ and the ‘Single Market’”198. Having 
praised the free movement right for creating a “more efficient allocation of 
resources” and “more integrated labour markets … better able to adjust to 
asymmetric shocks”199, the Commission acknowledged that its support of 
workers’ equality was grounded in improving overall economic success of 
the EU rather than in respect for human dignity200. The European 
Parliament and the Council have also pointed out economic benefits of 
intra-EU mobility – linking it to the “proper functioning of the internal 
market” (Directive 2014/54, Recital (10)), by “helping to satisfy the 
requirements of the economies of the Member States” (Regulation 
492/2011, Recital (4)). Such rhetoric regarding the free movement right is 
                                                                                                                            
inequalities in Europe: Facing the challenge, Berlin Social Science Center (WZB) 
Research Area Discussion Paper 2014-005. 
196 Peter Dwyer et al, Forced labour and UK immigration policy: Status matters, JRF 
Programme Paper (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2011); see also Migration Advisory 
Committee, Review of the transitional restrictions on access of Bulgarian and Romanian 
nationals to the UK labour market (Nov. 2011), 9. 
197 O’Brien, supra note 36, at 939. 
198 Commission of the European Communities, Commission’s action plan for skills 
and mobility, COM(2002) 72 final, 72. 
199 European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of 
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services and the further integration of labour markets. COM(2014) 06 final, 10. 
200 European Commission, Green Paper – European Social Policy: Options for the 
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in line with my analysis of secondary laws, which still retain an economic 
core despite having been expanded to non-economically active persons. 
Given that intra-EU mobility has been primarily from CEE to EU-15 States 
since the Eastern Enlargement, it is EU-15 States’ economies that have been 
emphasized and protected. 
Similarly, EU discourse regarding post-accession mobility derogations 
has focused on economic benefits accruing to EU-15 States. Although EU 
institutions were less enthusiastic about applying transitional measures than 
some EU-15 States were, they rarely acknowledged any conceptual or legal 
difficulties with the derogations. Instead, the Commission has tended to 
frame its critique in economic terms only, finding transitional measures 
unnecessary for ensuring EU-15 States’ economic interests, particularly in 
light of predictions of low CEE post-accession mobility201. Moreover, the 
Commission disfavored mobility restrictions because they were likely to 
hinder the functioning of the internal market202. After the Enlargement, the 
Commission continued to question the necessity of imposing transitional 
measures, but again, its critique focused on economic benefits to EU-15 
States of unlimited mobility203. On occasion, the Commission had even 
defended direct transitional mobility limitations – again, this was in 
economic terms only, for allegedly benefiting CEE States by better 
allocating labor204.  
As discussed in this Article, freedom of movement has never been an 
absolute right. Although expanded via secondary laws and especially ECJ 
decisions relying on Treaty provisions, the right has always differentiated 
between economically active movers and those with financial resources, as 
opposed to economically inactive and poor ones. Benefiting economics of 
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host, that is, EU-15 States has been prioritized over mobility rights of CEE 
nationals. Moreover, the complex web of EU law on social benefits has 
intersected with freedom of movement laws to further privilege EU-15 
States’ economic interests, which has also been reflected in EU rhetoric. As 
Cook205 had noted, “at the heart of the EU project lies a preoccupation with 
the mobility and residence rights of workers rather than citizens per se”. I 
argue that this mobility has always been structured—and, as needed, 
undermined by the EU—in the service of EU-15 Member States’ economic 
and political concerns. Although CEE nationals (and CEE states) have 
benefited in numerous ways from the Eastern Enlargement, such benefits 
appear ancillary. This brings to mind Derrick Bell’s interest convergence 
theory206, which, although based on black-white relations in the United 
States, can be expanded to encompass all dominant groups’ promotion of 
legal or social advances for groups with less power only when such 
advances also promote their own self-interest.  
Whereas mainstream CRT scholars postulate a view of racial relations 
and power differentials between whites and non-whites, some CWS 
scholars207 have noted the need for a more nuanced look at fractures and 
hierarchies within whiteness. My analysis of the policy of mobility indicates 
that CEE nationals have straddled belonging and exclusion from the bundle 
of rights that accrue from EU citizenship, pointing to a hierarchy of 
Europeanness, citizenship, and whiteness within the EU. Immigrants stand 
at the intersection of various binaries of privilege and subordination, and 
thus the need for adding more nuances to critical approaches to the study of 
law, race, and power. By testing and critiquing limitations of CRT and 
CWS, I hope to reinvigorate critical approaches to the study of law. 
Moreover, through the exploration of the internal boundaries of whiteness, I 
expose its fabrication, taking a step toward abolishing racism. As Justice 
Blackmun had noted in Bakke v. Regents of the University of California208, 
“[i]n order to go beyond racism, we must first take account of race.”  
More generally, my analysis here demonstrates how EU institutions 
have exhibited longstanding willingness to compromise the right of free 
movement209, undermining trust and solidarity among EU citizenry. Their 
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approach has diminished the status of and rights stemming from EU 
citizenship, challenged coherence of the EU legal order, and shown how 
malleable the concept of equality can be. This is especially problematic 
given that populist parties in several other EU-15 States have supported 
their own versions of Cameron’s pushback against the EU210. As O’Brien211 
had noted, since national measures limiting access to mobility and social 
benefits are not supported by evidence of negative economic effects of 
mobility, they are likely driven by capitalism and nationalistic prejudice. If 
EU institutions were to challenge—as they should—Member State attacks 
on mobility, they would have to begin by more closely matching their 
policies to their lofty rhetoric. 
 
 
                                                 
210 Including Austria, Denmark, Germany, and Sweden. See The ‘emergency brake’ is 
only symbolic, but it will probably work, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 2016, available at 
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